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Aleister Crowley Diary Entry Thursday, 1 December 1921
Helen Fraux arrived. What line are we to take as to — — — [I Ching Hexagram] XII.
1.11 P.M.
Whether this be petition principii or no matters little to me: the essence of my intuition is that I possess an interior idea of Unity which any definition can only complicate. Synthetic a priori judgement? I am entirely with Poincare as to the circular nature of all definitions (S et M p. 222). All intellectual enquiry asks: What are the relations between the elements of my Unconscious? and beyond this, it can only help us by guiding us toward the realization of those elements themselves. Thus, almost all men, even in infancy, know perfectly what 1 means, and distinguish it infallibly from 2. Burali-Forti has not thrown light upon this, or modified it. To me, the impotence of the intellect in these matters is another proof of its secondary and mechanical character; while the interior certainty of what Unity, etc mean, and the conformity of experience with these judgements, demonstrates the existence of an instrument of knowledge in the Unconscious, capable of appreciating the Universe accurately and directly. The simplest intellectual idea is necessarily in relation already, with others of the same order; for if not, it would be indefinable. Of course "Unity" is such an idea, in the sense in which it is merely the name of an indefinable idea in our Unconscious: there is thus an ambiguity, whence came the paradoxes indicated by Poincare, We cannot define One except in terms of One; or of Two whose definition involves One again, as he says: but the "one" in question is not the "One" that we all know perfectly by instinct. The real object of the attempt to define One was to compare various innate simple ideas with each other: and the process is useful so far as it helps us to explore our secret selves. and perhaps to coordinate their contents. Why for example do we reject a fallacy? When we examine the argument, the object is to prevent our consciousness from carelessly assenting to a proposition which outrages that instinct against sophisms, an instinct which automatically applies to all possible cases. We take for granted the absolute authority and integrity of that instinct, and attribute it to all men alike, whatever their mental and moral qualities: for all argument appeals to it, assuming that error must arise from false presentation, never from intrinsic defects. We cannot conceive of a mind as refusing to admit that B is C, directly that proposition is explained as equivalent to A is A. Reasoning aims at removing the disguises in which various intellectual or sensory imperfections have concealed Truth. It never dreams for an instant that any two minds can differ in the minutest respect as to what Truth is in itself, although admitting that Truth is indefinable. The whole of the Poincare-Russell controversy illustrates this. Each begs his opponent to refer his conscious conception less incorrectly to a standard which is assumed to be identical for both parties. It would be absurd to try to persuade others unless it were a postulate that all parties were essentially in absolute accord, and their disagreement due to self-deception. Poincare explains mathematical incapacity by various defects in men's power to combine certain faculties; he never suggests that there might be minds which really refused assent to 2 plus 2 = 4. That is, he assumes an invariable relation between a moral reaction and an intellectual perception. Now a relation of this sort is much nearer "Truth" than even the terms which compose it. 2 plus 2 = 4 is the intellectual expression of a mental attitude; it is an isolated symptom; but its constant connexion with approval discloses the internal character of the structure. And this connexion is such that its existence is self-evident; and would be equally so though its nature were otherwise. I mean that there could be no way of refuting it, exactly as in the case of rival kinds of space. We have accommodated the various geometries, but only be emasculating their essence. We have reduced them to sets of symbols; we have not changed our intuitive belied in Euclid, which depends on sense-perception, and is therefore in relation directly with our physiological system of conception.
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