CROWLEY'S APPEAL of

Crowley v. Constable & Co., Limited and Others

Publication of the Book, Laughing Torso

6 - 8 November 1934

In 1932 the author Nina Hamnett published a book entitled Laughing Torso. In it, she recounted several anecdotes about Crowley including a reference to him having "practised that loathsome thing known as Black Magic." Crowley considered himself to have been libeled by her and sought an injunction to cease production of the book.

On 20 September 1932, Crowley's attorney, Isidore Kerman, served a writ on Nina Hamnett's publisher, Constable & Co., to immediately cease production of Laughing Torso until the courts heard Crowley's libel complaint. Two days later in Vacation Court, Chancery, Crowley argued that Hamnett's collection of anecdotes about him were indecent, vulgar, and ignorant. They were equally untrue. and he couldn't understand how the book came to be written. On 22 September Justice Lawrence ruled that the injunction against Constable & Co. should stand until a 5 October 1932 hearing.

On 5 October, the injunction Crowley v. Constable and Co., Limited and Others came to court. After four hours' testimony and fifteen minutes' consideration, the injunction was defeated pending the outcome of the pending libel suit.

On 10-13 April 1934 the libel suit was held in the High Court of Justice, King's Bench Division, before Mr. Justice Swift and a Special Jury. On the third day the trial was paused by Justice Swift with the following words:

"Members of the Jury, a little over thirty-five minutes ago you intimated to me that you had made up your minds about this case, and that you did not want to hear any more about it. I pointed out to you that before you could stop it Mr. Eddy was entitled to address you. I also pointed out to you that you could only stop it in favour of the Defendants, and not in favour of the Plaintiff; that is to say, you cannot stop it an find a verdict against the Defendants until they have completed their cases. I also pointed out to you that before I took your verdict I must be satisfied that you understand the issues that you are trying.

 

"If you are still of the same mind, and think that you have heard enough of this case all that I have got to say to you about the issues is that the Plaintiff has got to prove that he has been libelled. The Defendants have got to prove that the libel was justified. The Plaintiff has got to prove that his reputation was damaged. If you think that the Plaintiff fails on the ground that he was never libelled, or if you think that he fails no the ground that his reputation was not damaged, or if you think that the Defendants have justified, then your verdict should be for the Defendants. You cannot, at this stage, give a verdict against the Defendants. You may, at this stage, give a verdict against the Plaintiff.

 

"I have nothing to say about the facts except this: I have been for over forty years engaged in the administration of the law, in one capacity or another, I thought that I knew every conceivable form of wickedness. I thought that everything which was vicious and bad had been produced, at one time or another, before me. I have learned in this case that we can always learn something more if we live long enough. Never have I heard such dreadful, horrible, blasphemous, abominable stuff as that which has been produced by the man who describes himself to you as the greatest living poet."

The jury stopped the case, with the foreman saying they were unanimous in finding a verdict for the defendants.

Judgment was thereupon against Crowley and given for the defendants, with costs. Crowley would later appeal the decision in this trial on 6-8 November 1934.

The appeal went against Crowley. Lord Justice Greer, in giving judgment,

said that the case had been very well argued. It was not free from difficulty, but they had come to the conclusion that, although there might be something to be said in favour of the view that the summing up was not as full as it ought reasonably to have been, the only possible result of the trial, having regard to the evidence and the admissions of a verdict for the defendants. However much the contentions of Mr. Eddy might have been repeated by the Judge the result would have been exactly the same. The plaintiff was cross-examined for a long time in the witness-box, and he had made admissions which were described by the Judge in his summing up as admission of the grossest kind he had heard in 40 years’ experience at the Bar and on the Bench. He said:—“Never have I heard such dreadful, horrible, blasphemous, and abominable stuff as that which has been produced by the man who describes himself as the greatest living poet.” That, however, did not relieve the Court of Appeal of the duty of considering what the position was at the time the jury intervened.

 

The plaintiff of some words used in a chapter in a book of anecdotes or autobiography written by a lady named Miss Hamnett entitled Laughing Torso. It was not right, said the Lord Justice, that words should be interpreted without their context.

 

He (the Lord Justice) regarded the statement as being capable of a defamatory meaning. But there could not be left out of consideration the fact that there was no innuendo pleaded. Therefore, the plaintiff could only treat those words without any innuendo, as having the ordinary meaning of English words.

 

The suggestion that the words complained of meant that the plaintiff had killed a baby seemed to be an extravagant interpretation of the words. The jury would not be likely to come to the conclusion that the words meant that by means of Black Magic the plaintiff had caused a baby to be killed. The case had been going on for about four days, and the evidence of the plaintiff had been concluded. Mr. Hilbery had cross-examined the plaintiff and had obtained admissions from him. Was it astonishing that the time came when the jury felt it was impossible for them to give a verdict for the plaintiff?

 

In the summing-up the Judge said that the plaintiff had to prove that his reputation had been damaged. That was not quite accurate. All that a plaintiff had to do in a libel action was to prove that a defamatory statement had been published about him and the law presumed the damage, and he would be entitled at least to nominal damages.

 

But it did not follow because there had been a misdirection in one respect that there ought to be a new trial. Order 39, rule 6, of the Supreme Court Rules applied to this case. Under that rule a new trial should not be granted on the ground of misdirection or other grounds specified in the rule, unless in the opinion of the Court of Appeal some substantial miscarriage of justice had been occasioned. A new trial ought not to be granted in this case, because, having regard to the evidence, the result of a new trial would be the same if the case came to be dealt with by another jury of ordinary human beings, and the parties ought not to be put to the expense of a new trial if it could only arrive at the same result. He had come to the conclusion that there was no substantial miscarriage of justice in this case, and the appeal must be dismissed.

Lord Justice Slesser and Lord Justice Roche agreed thus dismissing the appeal.

Additionally, as a result of personal correspondence produced as evidence by Crowley, he was later arrested on 21 June 1934 and later forced to stand trial on 24-25 July 1934 for being in possession of stolen property, namely five letters belonging to Betty May, a witness in the Crowley v Constable proceedings.